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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
DIONICIO BLANCO JR., 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 20050251-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
% * * 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Defendant appeals from a conviction for assualt by a prisoner, a third degree 
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102.5 (West 2004). This Court has 
jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (West 2004). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Did the trial court properly admit evidence that defendant, an inmate, 
possessed non-regulation footwear, where that evidence was relevant to his intent 
to cause bodily injury by stomping and kicking another inmate? 
Standard of Review. This Court reviews a trial court's decision to admit 
evidence under rule 404(b), Utah Rules of Evidence, of a defendant's other acts for 
abuse of discretion. State v. Widdison, 2001 UT 60,i42,28 P.3d 1278. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
This appeal requires consideration of rules 401, 402, 403, Utah Rules of 
Evidence, attached as addenda. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
While incarcerated, defendant assaulted another prisoner. The State charged 
defendant with one count of assault by a prisoner, a third degree felony (R. 4-8). A 
jury convicted defendant as charged (R. 43; 109:195). The court sentenced him to a 
prison term of zero-to-five-years, to be served concurrently with the sentence he was 
currently serving (R. 93-94). The court also ordered defendant to pay $14,368.23 
restitution (R. 94). Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal (R. 98). He now asserts 
that the trial court improperly admitted evidence that shortly after the assault 
defendant possessed an unauthorized pair of shoes. Aplt. Br. at 7. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On February 13,2003, both defendant and Levi Hopper were inmates at the 
Weber County Jail. (R. 109:66, 68). Hopper had previously borrowed food from 
defendant, and owed defendant two Snickers bars and two packages of cookies (R. 
109:71-72). Defendant wanted to be repaid (R. 109:72,74). When Hopper explained 
that he could not yet repay him, defendant punched Hopper in the head (R. 109:74-
75). The blow knocked Hopper to the floor where defendant kicked him twice and 
stomped on his chest (R. 109:76, 78-79). 
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The punch to the head cut defendant's face underneath his left eye and caused 
defendant's nose to bleed (R. 109:78). The kicks and stomp left red marks on 
defendant's shoulder and bruising and red marks on defendant's chest (R. 109:93). 
Hopper feared being labeled a snitch, so he waited to report the assault until 
the guards noticed his injuries and took him to get medical attention (R. 109:82,88). 
On the way to the medical center, Hopper told Officer Robert Lemmon that 
defendant had assaulted him (R. 109:88,132). Officer Lemmon left Hopper at the 
medical center and returned to the cell block and the checked knuckles of every 
inmate in the block (R. 109:136-37). He noticed some swelling between the knuckles 
of defendant's left hand (R. 109:137). 
A few days after the assault, Hopper completed his sentence and was released 
from jail (R. 109:95). He immediately visited a physician for treatment of the injuries 
he received from defendant (R. 109:95). Dr. Douglas Anderson diagnosed 
defendant with multiple fractures around his eye socket (R. 109:111). He performed 
reconstructive surgery and implanted three plates around defendant's eye socket to 
prevent the fractured bones from pinching the nerves (R. 109:112-13). 
The State charged defendant with assault by a prisoner (R. 4-8). At trial, the 
State presented testimony from Hopper, Officer Lemmon, and Dr. Anderson (R. 
109:66,108,120). Defendant called no witnesses (R. 109). 
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During the examination of Officer Lemmon, the prosecutor asked him if he 
had confiscated any items from defendant that were relevant to the assault (R. 
109:140). Defense counsel objected (R. 140). The court held an unreported sidebar 
conference and overruled defense counsel's objection (R. 109:140). Officer Lemmon 
then testified that a few days after the assault defendant was found in possession of 
an unauthorized pair of shoes (R. 109:140-41). He explained that inmates normally 
wear soft rubber sandals and that "the jail's very picky about what shoes they will 
allow and will not allow inmates to have" (R. 109:141). 
Defense counsel asked to voir dire Officer Lemmon (R. 109:142). During the 
voir dire examination, Officer Lemmon explained that defendant was moved twice 
and that Officer Lemmon did not see the shoes the first time he moved defendant 
(R. 109:142). 
Defense counsel objected again, claiming that the incident with the shoes was 
"completely irrelevant" (R. 109:143) The State responded that the discovery of the 
shoes was relevant "[b]ased on the injuries that Mr. Hopper had and the fact that he 
was stomped on the chest" (R. 109:143). The court overruled defense counsel's 
objection (R. 109:143). Defense counsel persisted, complaining that there was no 
evidence that Hopper's injuries were caused by any particular kind of shoes and 
that the State was trying to "prejudice the jury by saying [defendant] had some 
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illegal shoes a couple days hi it T" (K lil'H 1 'It, 'I he u mi I ivpcMted 11i«i f f he objection 
was overruled (K. !UlU I-I 
• The shoes were not ft irtl ler discussed during Officer Lemmon's testimony and 
were not mentioned in the closing arguments of either party (R. 1 09:175-190). The' 
prosecutor did argue, however, that the element of causing bodily injury was met 
by the injury from the blow to the head and the injuries I w iii Kicking ane t^< • • . : u 
(R. 109:179). The jury convicted defendant or u—.r . ,• v- i K -i " ^>-' 
SUMMARY Ui ARGUMENT 
The evidence of defendants non regulation footwear was relevant to show 
his intent and ability to cause bodily injury to Levi Hopper by kicking J HI*, -;;^ 
stomping on him. That evidence presented so little prejudice lluit il is jdinissible 
under rule 403, even though the proki live value IV,IS low 
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ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY ADMITTED EVIDENCE THAT 
DEFENDANT POSSESSED NON-REGULATION FOOTWEAR 
Defendant claims that the trial court improperly admitted evidence that, after 
the assault, the guards confiscated a pair of non-regulation shoes from him. Br. 
Aplt. 8-9. He claims the evidence was improperly admitted under rule 403, Utah 
Rules of Evidence, because its probative value was substantially outweighed by the 
danger of unfair prejudice. Br. Aplt. at 9.1 
Defendant's claim is meritless because the evidence was relevant and only 
nominally prejudicial. Moreover, any error was harmless. 
A. The evidence was relevant to show defendant's intent and 
ability to cause bodily injury and was only nominally 
prejudicial. 
This Court reviews a trial court's decision to admit evidence for abuse of 
discretion. State v. Alonzo, 973 P.2d 975, 980 (Utah 1998). This Court gives trial 
judges "broad discretion in admitting or excluding evidence that requires appraisal 
of its probative and prejudicial value." Id. It will affirm if, "absent specific rule 403 
1
 Defendant also cites to rule 404(b) and claims the contested evidence was a 
bad act. Br. Aplt. at 2, 7. But he never objected on rule 404(b) grounds below. 
Rather, he objected only on relevance and unfair prejudice grounds (R. 109:140-143). 
Accordingly, this Court should decide defendant's claim only under rules 402 and 
403, Utah Rules of Evidence. See State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74,111,10 P.3d 346 ("As 
a general rule, claims not raised before the trial court may not be raised on appeal.") 
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findings, |il| can find sonic basis in I he nwn\l lor J n klint; thai 1!HJI I'n.i! < ouil's 
actions were not ai i abuse of discretion. Id 
Ii flii-i i\}>{\, the r o n l e s l e d e v i d e n c e w a s re levant to s h o w defendant ' s intent 
a^  -d ause serious bodily injury. Although the probative value of the 
contested evidence was low, its prejudicial effect was even lower. The trial coiirt 
thus properly admitted the evidence. 
* The evidence was offered to show defendant s inte. 
cause bodily injury. 
evidence is admissible." Utah R. Evid. 402. Evidence is relevant 
if it has "any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the 
determination of the action more probable or less probable than it won Id be without 
the evidence." Utah R. Evid. 4*. the instant case, ;no :nau i>;fuvd v -* *r 
that defendant possessed non-regulation shot> lor fho pui pose of showing his intent 
and ahihl v In« JUSO bodily IPJIII V rim i rime of assault by a prisoner requires the 
Stal'' lo pm> •» iTi-it d e f e n d a n t c o m m i t t e d "an assault , in t end ing to cause b o d i l y 
injury;' Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102.5 (West 2004), , M J IviiiK Injury means 
''physical pain, illness, or any impairment of physical condition, i MM. ^ K .\. n. § 
76-1-601 (West 2004). 




 ; ; • ie made of "soft rubber" and are 
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"more or less a sandal" (R. 109:141). He further explained that "the jail's very picky 
about what shoes they will allow and will not allow inmates to have" (R. 109:141). 
He then testified that defendant "had some shoes that he was not authorized to 
have," and that the shoes were not "the standard shower shoes" (R. 109:141). 
From Officer Lemmon's testimony, the jury could reasonably infer that the 
rubber sandals issued by the jail made it difficult for inmates to cause bodily injury 
by kicking a guard or another inmate. Defendant's possession of non-regulation 
footwear was thus evidence that he intended to cause bodily injury to Levi Hopper 
by kicking and stomping on him in a shoe other than a soft, rubber sandal. It was 
also evidence that he had the ability to cause bodily injury. 
2. The evidence was not substantially more prejudicial than 
probative. 
Under rule 403, a court may exclude evidence if "its probative value is 
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice." Utah R. Evid. 403. 
"[T]he fact that evidence is prejudicial does not, by itself, render that evidence 
inadmissible." State v. Ramirez, 924 P.2d 366,369-70 (Utah App. 1996). "Rather, '[i]f 
the evidence is prejudicial but is at least equally probative[,] . . . it is properly 
admissible. Id. at 370 (quoting State v. Taylor, 818 P.2d 561, 571 (Utah App. 1991)) 
(alterations in Ramirez). 
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Concededly, the probative \/«u* v ten: . e
 ; - ^ - ^ i - :^ 
r e g u l a t i o n s h o e s ib ;ow . :i - j-,v,L- «. . . •• • * - * n !o\ <r. Possession of 
irregulai shoes is nol the soil evidence that will "rouse the jury to overmastering 
hnstifiily "' smli ih.il it cannot fairly and impartially decided the case. State v. 
SUckles, 760 P.2d 291, 296 (Utah 1988) (citations and quotations omitted). This is 
particularly true where the defendant is on trial for punching another inmai, :;. 
head so hard that a physician had to surgically reconstriu. L defendant's eye son ket 
with plates. 
E * admitting the evidence was harmless. 
Even if the court did improperly admitted evidence that defendant possessed 
non-regulation shoes, the error was harmless. ' (AJII erroneous evidentiary » ulm^ 
will lead to reversal only if, absent tl le error, there is a reasonable likelihood that 
there would ha\ e been a more? fax enable result lor llie defendant/' State v. Kooyman, 
I ,i ' ' V*- ' I d [232 (quotations and citations omitted); see also 
Utah R. Evid. 103 ("Error may not be predicated upon a ruling which admits or 
excludes evidence unless a substantial right of the party is affected . . . . " ) . 
At trial, the state presented clear, un-rebutted lestimony from the Levi 
Hopper that defendant p i a u u * • - . . and kicked and stomped on his 
chest
 t ; * : 7 J " - II .. -• resented a motive for defendant to 
.•van umenl of a snack debt—and corroborating physical 
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evidence—defendant's swollen knuckles (R. 109:71-72; 137). Defendant responded 
to that evidence only by arguing that Hopper was convicted felon and that the State 
presented no other witnesses to the assault, even though other inmates were present 
(R. 109:184-86). Defendant presented no motive for Hopper to fabricate his 
testimony, however, and did not present any alternative theory of how Hopoper 
sustained his injuries. It is therefore improbable that, absent the contested evidence, 
the jury would have acquitted defendant. Accordingly, any error was harmless. See 
Kooyman, 2005 UT App 222, % 15. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests the Court to affirm 
defendant's convictions. 
Respectfully submitted December 14,2005. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL 
MATTHEW D. BATES 
Assistant Attorney General 
Counsel for Appellee 
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Cl iKT IHCATI ' lOM iHK t I CI'I 
foreg( >ing Brief of Appellee upon the defendant/appellant, Dionicio Blanco Jr., by 
causing them to be delivered by first class mail to his counsel of record as follows: 
Randall W. Richards 
The Public Defender Association, Inc. of Weber County 
2550 Washington Boulevard 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
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Addenda 
Rule 401. Definition of "relevant evidence." 
"Relevant evidence" means evidence having any tendency to 
make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the 
determination of the action more probable or less probable than 
it would be without the evidence. 
Rule 402. Relevant evidence generally admissible; 
irrelevant evidence inadmissible. 
All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise 
provided by the Constitution of the United States or the 
Constitution of the state of Utah, statute, or by these rules, or by 
other rules applicable in courts of this state. Evidence which is 
not relevant is not aHmissihlp 
Rule 403. Exclusion of relevant evidence on grounds of 
prejudice, confusion, or waste of time. 
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded mis probative 
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair 
prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by 
considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless 
presentation of cumulative evidence. 
